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This article summarizes patent, trade secret, trademark, domain name,
and copyright law developments in 2016, across multiple jurisdictions
worldwide.,
I.
A.

Patents2
UNITED STATES

Many federal court decisions in the past year have attempted to define the
boundaries of the Supreme Court's broad language in precedent cases on the

issue of patent eligible subject matter, specifically in the area of life sciences
with respect to their interpretations of the holdings in Mayo v. Prometheus,
Ass'n for Molecular Pathology v. Myriad Genetics Inc., and in the area of
computer science as a result of interpretations of Alice Corp. v. CLS Bank
Int'l.3

Guidance in life science technology came this year regarding the
application of the precedents set by Mayo and Myriad, in which the Supreme
4
Court ruled that a law of nature is not eligible for a patent. In Rapid
Litigation v. Cellzdirect, the United States Court of Appeals for the Federal
Circuit (Federal Circuit) found the processes for cryogenically freezing liver
* Susan Brushaber, Reinhardt LLP, Denver, Colorado served as the editor for this 2016
review. Amanda Covington, Denver, Colorado, was assistant editor Section editors are
identified in each section.
1. For developments during 2015, see Susan J. Brushaber et al., InternationalIntellectual
Property Law, 50 Int'l Law. 193-209 (2015).
2. Patents Section Editor: Robin Fahlberg, State Farm Insurance Company, Bloomington,
Illinois. Authors: Amanda Covington, Denver, Colorado (on the United States); Fabio Guzmin
Saladin and Pamela Benzin Arbaje, Guzmin Ariza, Santo Domingo, the Dominican Republic
(on the Dominican Republic).
3. Alice Corp. Pty. Ltd. v. CLS Bank Int'l, 134 S. Ct. 2347 (2014); Ass'n for Molecular Pathology
v. Myriad Genetics Inc., 133 S. Ct. 2107 (2013); Mayo CollaborativeServices v. Prometheus Labs.,
Inc., 132 S. Ct. 1289 (2012).
4. Sean Sheridan, How Mayo, Myriad and Alice May Impact Patent Valuations, LAw 360 (Mar.
26 3
70/how-mayo-myriad-and-alice-may4, 2015, 8:48 AM), http://www.law360.com/articles/6
impact-patent-valuations.
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cells to be patent eligible because they were directed toward an improved
process of saving a type of liver cell called "Hepatocytes."5 The inventors
had found that the process of preserving cells could be improved upon by
separating the viable cells from the non-viable ones and refreezing the viable
cells.6 The twice-frozen cells behaved like once-frozen cells.7 The claims
were patent eligible because they did more than identify or observe a
concept; the claims were directed to a new cell preservation method.8 This
case signals that the Federal Circuit may apply the Supreme Court's
decisions with a narrower viewpoint in the life science realm.
Under Alice, patents may be subject matter ineligible due to the broad
language stating that inventions using a computer to implement an abstract
idea are not patent worthy.9 This past year, the Federal Circuit applied Alice
in two different cases involving computer technology and held that in each
case the subject matter was patent eligible. The Federal Circuit held in
Enfish v. Microsoft Corp. that the claims were patent eligible because they
improved upon the way a computer perates by using a self-referential table
to store data, which is superior to conventional databases.10 Similarly, in
Bascom Global v. AT&T Mobility the Federal Circuit held that an
improvement on computer function by the process of iltering internet
content was not an abstract idea." These rulings give some hope and
guidance to software inventors. Until further direction is given by the
Court, together Enfish and Bascom provide signposts to help inventors,
patent practitioners, and litigants determine what is a patent subject matter
eligible claim in a software patent.
B.

THE DoMicAN REPUBLIC

In September 2016 the National Office of Industrial Property (ONAPI)
for the first time granted a national utility model patent to the Instituto
Tecnol6gico de Santo Domingo, a Dominican university (INTEC). The
registration involved the invention of an automatic heating catalyst in
internal combustion engines. Two twenty-one-year-old engineering
students developed the invention with the guidance of their professors and
the help of the Technology and Innovation Support Center (TISC) of
ONAPI based in INTEC. The invention is considered to be green and
innovative because it seeks to inhibit the emission of vehicle gases, thus
diminishing the pollution caused by such emissions.12 After this favorable
5. Rapid Litig. Mgmt. v. Cellzdirect, Inc., 827 F.3d 1042 (Fed. Cir. 2016).
6. Id. at 1047-48.
7. Id. at 1045.
8. Id. at 1048.
9. Alice Corp. v. CLS Bank Int'l, 134 S. Ct. 2347, 2352 (2014).
10. Enfish, LLC v. Microsoft Corp., 822 F. 3d 1327, 1337-38 (2016).
11. Bascom Glob. Internet Services, Inc. v. ATIrT Mobility LLC, 827 F.3d 1341, 1353-54 (Fed.
Cir. 2016).
12. INTEC recibe primera Patente Nacional otorgada por ONAPI a una Universidad dominicana,
ONAPI,
http://www.onapi.gov.do/noticiascomunicaciones/191-septiembre-2016/924-intec-
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private-public experience, ONAPI has entered into diverse collaboration
agreements with other universities all over the Dominican territory for the
opening of new TISCs.'1
On May 27, 2016, the Supreme Cout of Justice revoked and declared
unconstitutional Article 157 of Law 20-00 on Industrial Property, which
states that the resolutions issued by the General Director of ONAPI could
be appealed to the Court of Appeals. In the decision, the Supreme Court
indicated that resolutions issued by ONAPI are administrative acts; and
therefore, according to the Dominican Constitution, the jurisdiction belongs
to the Administrative Courts which are charged with ensuring the legality of
the administrative proceedings.14 This decision invalidated the decision
rendered by the Administrative Court on 2013 declaring it had no
jurisdiction to rule on claims regarding resolutions issued by ONAPI.15
According to ONAPI statistics, fromJanuary 1, 2016 to October 13, 2016,
267 applications were filed for patents, of which 44 were national and 223
were international. Of the 267 applications, 213 of the applications were
filed for patents, 14 for utility models and 40 for industrial designs. From
2010 to 2015 the number of patent applications declined significantly, with
406 applications in 2010 and only 309 in 2015.16
II.

Trade Secrets17

A.

UNITED STATES

On May 11, 2016, after unanimous passage in the Senate, and passage by a
410-2 vote in the House,18 President Obama signed into law the Defend
Trade Secrets Act (DTSA).19 The DTSA, which was effective immediately,20
amends the 1996 Industrial Espionage Act21 by creating a federal civil cause
recibe-primera-patente-nacional-otorgada-por-onapi-a-una-universidad-dosinicana.html

(last

visited Nov. 7, 2016).
13. ONAPI instalard Centro de Apoyo en Universidad de La Vega, ONAPI, http://www.onapi
.gov.do/noticiascomunicaciones/145-marzo-2014/760-onapi-instalara-centro-de-apoyo-en-

universidad-de-la-vega.html (last visited Nov. 7, 2016).
14. Shell Int'l Brands AG v. ONAPI, S. Ct. of Justice, Third chamber, decision No. 237 (May
27, 2015).
15. Barthel Intertrade Inc. v. ONAPI, Super. Admin. Ct., decision No. 489-2013 (Dec. 27,
2013).
16. Grdficas Estadisticas de Publicaciones, ONAPI, http://www.onapi.gov.do/graficasestadisticas-publicaciones.html (last visited Nov. 9, 2016).
17. Trade Secrets Section Editor: Susan J. Brushaber, Reinhardt LLP, Denver, CO. Authors:
Amanda Covington, Denver, Colorado (on the United States); Virginia Brown, Keyder, New
York (on Europe).

18. S.1890 - Defend Trade Secrets Act of 2016, CONGRESS.cov, https://www.congress.gov/
22
roll-callbill/I 14th-congress/senate-bill/1890/all-actions?overview=closed&q=%7B%
vote%22%3A%22all%22%7D.
19. Defend Trade Secrets Act of 2016, Pub. L. No. 114-153, 130 Stat. 376 (2016).
20. Defend Trade Secrets Act amending US Code 18, s. 1836.
21. 18 U.S.C. §§ 1831-1839

Published by SMU Scholar, 2017

3

The Year in Review, Vol. 51, No. 1 [2017], Art. 14
206

THE YEAR IN REVIEW

[VOL. 51

of action joining state law as embodied in the Uniform Trade Secrets Act
(UTSA) adopted by forty-eight states to allow for a federal cause of action
for the misappropriation of a trade secret. The DTSA allows for new
remedies to be sought under federal law instead of only through state law
claims.
While there are some similarities with state trade secret laws, the DTSA
does create some new remedies and caveats. One similarity is that the
DTSA's definition of a trade secrets is the same as that of the Uniform Trade
Secrets Act.22 Also, like the Uniform Trade Secrets Act, the DTSA provides
for a three-year statute of limitations. Its damage remedies also mirror those
of the Uniform Trade Secrets Act.23
Other provisions in the DTSA do not have a parallel in the Uniform
Trade Secrets Act. In the case of misappropriation, the DTSA provides a
new seizure procedure in cases where the party being ordered would have to
"destroy, move, hide, or otherwise make such matter inaccessible to the
court" in order for the court to prevent dissemination of the trade secret. 24
It also creates protection for whistleblowers from any retaliatory accusations
of a trade secret misappropriation. But this protection only exists so long as
the whistleblower discloses the information pertinent to the trade secret to
court or government officials in confidence.25
The DTSA gives plaintiffs some new options and even though some of
the provisions of the DTSA resemble those in the Uniform Trade Secrets
Act, the DTSA does not preempt existing state law.26 Thus, with the passage
of the DTSA, plaintiffs can choose to file in state court or federal court.
The benefit of filing in federal court, in addition to some new remedies, is
that if the courts in a state are back-logged, the ability to file in federal court
will generally expedite adjudication. While in-house preventative measures
are the best course of action to secure trade secrets from being
misappropriated, now there is an alternative avenue to pursue a claim of
misappropriation.

B.

EUROPE

In 2016, intellectual property (IP)-based on disclosure and secrecyjoined forces in new legislation enacted in both the United States and the
European Union. Trade secrets, in the public mind centered around the
formula for Coca Cola, dovetailed in an effort to provide a less costly and
potentially longer-term form of protection of inventions than provided by
22. John Carson & Cameron Cushman, DTSA Versus UTSA: A Comparison ofMajor Provisions,
LAw 360 Gune 8, 2016), https://www.law360.com/articles/803049/dtsa-versus-utsa-acomparison-of-major-provisions.

23.
24.
25.
26.

Defend
Defend
Defend
Defend

Trade
Trade
Trade
Trade

Secrets
Secrets
Secrets
Secrets

Act
Act
Act
Act

of 2016,
of 2016,
of 2016,
of 2016,

Pub. L. No. 114-153, 130 Stat. 376, 380 (2016).
§ 2, 130 Stat. at 377 (2016).
§ 7, 130 Stat. at 385 (2016).
§ 2, 130 Stat. at 382 (2016).
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patents, a common standard for employee non-compete clauses, and default
protection of data, whether valuable or damaging.
The EU Directive27 (the Directive) sets out harmonizing legislative goals,
which EU Member States have until June 9, 2018 to implement. For
readers unfamiliar with the structure of EU law, this basically means that the
core provisions of the Directive will be inserted into national law where they
will become subject to general principles of EU law, including fundamental
rights, proportionality, protection against abuse of process, free movement
of goods, services, capital and people, and legal certainty. Provisions of
national law enacted pursuant to the Directive are also subject to the
interpretation of the European Court of Justice.
At present, laws of the EU member states vary widely on the subject of
trade secrets, with only Sweden having a specific Act on the Protection of
Trade Secrets.28 Other Member States situate and define trade secrets in a
variety of categories from common law confidentiality in the UK, to unfair
competition and provisions of Civil and Commercial Codes in other
Member States.29
The Directive institutes a common definition of "trade secret."30
Exceptions to its application include: freedom of expression and
information; freedom and pluralism of the media; the public interest in
disclosure for administrative or judicial authorities; disclosure of information
3
submitted by businesses where necessary; and collective agreements.
Article 1, § 3 of the Directive provides that mobility of workers shall not be
hindered.
Article 3 identifies methods of legal acquisition of trade secrets that
include independent discovery, reverse engineering by someone in legal
possession of the object, information acquired through workers' rights and
honest commercial practice. Unlawful means of acquisition of trade secrets
includes "unauthorized access to . . . any documents, objects, materials,

substances or electronic files, lawfully under the control of the trade secret
27. Council Directive 2016/9433, art. 1-18, 2016 O.J. (L 157) 1, 1.
28. Om Skydd For Foretagshemligheter, Lag (1990:409), (Swe.) translated in, Act on the
Protection of Trade Secrets (1990:409), WORLD INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY ORGANIZATION,
3
http://www.wipo.int/wipolex/en/details.jsp?id= 610.
29. See Study on Trade Secrets and Confidential Business Information in the Internal Market,
EuRoPEAN COMMISSION (Apr. 2013), http://ec.europa.eu/internal-market/iprenforcement/
docs/trade-secrets/1 3071 1_final-study-en.pdf.
30. Council Directive 2016/9433, supra note 27, at 9.
For the purposes of this Directive, the following definitions apply: (1) 'trade secret'
means information which meets all of the following requirements: (a) it is secret in
the sense that it is not, as a body or in the precise configuration and assembly of its
components, generally known among or readily accessible to persons within the
circles that normally deal with the kind of information in question; (b) it has
commercial value because it is secret; (c) it has been subject to reasonable steps
under the circumstances, by the person lawfully in control of the information, to
keep it secret.

31. Id. Art. 1 § 2.

Published by SMU Scholar, 2017

5

The Year in Review, Vol. 51, No. 1 [2017], Art. 14
208

THE YEAR IN REVIEW

[VOL. 51

holder, containing the trade secret or from which the trade secret can be
deduced,"32 and other conduct contrary to honest commercial practices.
Use of a trade secret is deemed unlawful if carried out by anyone who
acquired it unlawfully, is in breach of a confidentiality agreement (or other
duty not to disclose), or is in breach of a contractual duty to limit its use. 33
An action for disclosure will be dismissed where the disclosure involves the
exercise of freedom of expression, as mentioned above, revealing of
misconduct or illegal activity, disclosure by workers to their representatives,
or protecting a legitimate interest recognized by EU or national law.34
Extensive measures for protection of trade secrets during legal
proceedings and for protection of personal data are contained in Article 9.
Provisional and precautionary measures include cessation or prohibition of
the use of the trade secret, prohibition of the production, marketing,
importation, export, or storage of infringing goods, and seizure of suspected
infringing goods, including imported goods.35 Finally, Article 11 lists factors
to be considered by the judicial authority and the nature of specific
circumstances to be evaluated are also set out in detail.36
Article 12 remedies-injunctions and corrective measures-include the
"destruction of all or part of any document, object, material, substance or
electronic file containing or embodying the trade secret or, where
appropriate, the delivery up to the applicant of all or part of those
documents, objects, materials, substances or electronic files."37

Pecuniary compensation may also be awarded in place of injunctions and
corrective measures and damages may be awarded when the infringer "knew
or ought to have known that he, she or it was engaging in unlawful
acquisition, use or disclosure of a trade secret."38 Member States may "limit
the liability for damages of employees towards their employers for the
unlawful acquisition, use or disclosure of a trade secret of the employer
where they act without intent."39
Although the Directive provides no criminal sanctions and expressly
refrains from creating a new form of intellectual property, which leaves it
outside the scope of application of the EU Enforcement Directive,40 like its
IP counterpart in the United States it risks undermining the basic
justifications for intellectual property: that disclosure in return for monopoly
fosters prosperity; and that individuals should be the beneficiaries of their
own creative and inventive ideas. It makes the goose that laid the golden egg
very uncomfortable.
32.
33.
34.
35.
36.
37.
38.
39.
40.

Id. Art. 4 § 2.
Id. Art. 4 § 3.
Id. Art. 5.
Id. Art. 10.
Id. Art. 11.
Id. Art. 12.
Id. Art. 14.
Id.
Council Directive 2004/48, art. 2, 2004 OJ. (L 157) 16, 19.
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III. Trademarks41
A.

UNITED STATES

The Federal Circuit issued a landmark decision, In re Tam,42 holding that
the federal prohibition on registration of "disparaging" trademarks is
unconstitutional and in conflict with the First Amendment. In the case,
applicant Mr. Simon Shiao Tam was denied registration of the mark THE
SLANTS in connection with musical entertainment services. The court
reasoned that the mark was disparaging to people of Asian descent. The
Federal Circuit acknowledged that the district court correctly applied the
disparagement test. In so holding the Federal Circuit overturned a thirtyfive-year old case In re McGinley,43 which had held that section 2(a) of the
Lanham Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1052(a), does not implicate the First Amendment.
After the Federal Circuit's decision issued, the U.S. Department of Justice
submitted a letter brief to the Federal Circuit stating its disagreement with
the holding. The Department of Justice suggested that the ruling in In re
Tam would lead to undesirable consequences because under the decision
trademark registration would extend to scandalous and immoral marks
covered under section 2(a) of the Lanham Act.44 The USPTO's reaction has
been to suspend action on the SLANTS application as well as all
applications that it has determined are disparaging, immoral or scandalous,
on the ground that it is awaiting further court instruction. On April 20,
2016, the USPTO filed a petition for a writ of certiorari seeking Supreme
Court review, which was granted in September 2016.
In Belmora LLC v. Bayer Consumer Care AG,45 the Fourth Circuit
overturned the United States District Court for the Eastern District of
Virginia and held that the Lanham Act permits an owner of a foreign mark,
even one who does not use its mark in the United States, to assert priority
rights over a mark that is registered and used by another party domestically.
Bayer Consumer Care AG (Bayer) sells naproxen sodium tablets in Mexico
under the brand name FLANAX. In 2004, Belmora LLC (Belmora) began
selling naproxen sodium tablets in the United States under the brand name
FLANAX, and obtained a federal registration for FLANAX in 2005. Bayer
petitioned to cancel the FLANAX registration in 2007, and seven years later,
the Trademark Trial and Appeal Board (TTAB) cancelled the registration,
41. Trademarks Section Editor: Susan J. Brushaber, Reinhardt LLP, Denver, CO. Authors:
Holly B. Lance, Smith, Gambrell & Russell, Washington D.C. (on the United States); Daniel
Cooper, Cooper & Kurz, Stamford CT (on Europe); Fabio Guzman Saladin and Pamela
Benzin Arbaje, Guzmin Ariza, Santo Domingo, the Dominican Republic (on the Dominican
Republic). Manish Dhingra, Mrityunjay Kumar, Sameep Vijayvergiya, Dhingra & Singh,
Attorneys at Law, Delhi, India (on India); and David Taylor, Hogan Lovells, Paris (on Domain
Names).
42. In re Tam, 808 F.3d 1321 (Fed. Cir. 2015).
43. In re McGinley 660, F.2d 481, 484 (C.C.P.A. 1981).
44. See Letter from U.S. Dept. of Justice, to Daniel E. O'Toole, Clerk, U.S. Court of Appeals
for the Federal Circuit (Jan. 21, 2016), http://src.bna.com/cd6.
45. Belmora LLC v. Bayer Consumer Care AG, 819 F.3d 697 (4th Cir. 2016).
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holding that Belmora was using the FLANAX mark to misrepresent the
source of the goods. Belmora appealed the TTAB's decision to the district
court, and Bayer sued Belmora for false designation of origin and false
advertising. The district court, applying the Supreme Court decision
Lexmark Int'l, Inc. v. Static Control Components, Inc.,46 dismissed Bayer's
claims. The Fourth Circuit held that the district court erred in its analysis,
and that the Lanham Act does not require ownership and use of a mark in
the U.S. as a threshold requirement. It further held that Bayer's claims fell
within the statute's protected zone of interests and should be permitted to
proceed. In October 2016, Belmora filed a petition for a writ of certiorari
from the Supreme Court.

B.

EUROPE

In mid-December 2015, the European Union issued a new directive and a
new regulation, respectively, on the law of trademarks. The Directive came
into effect in January 2016, and the Regulation came into force in March.47
Implementation of the directive by EU Member States is required by
January 2019. Several of the changes from previous EU trademark law are
procedural and, indeed, one is cosmetic. Under the new Regulation, the
European trademark office-which used to be known as the Office for
Harmonization in the Internal Market (OHIM)-is now more appropriately
called the "European Union Intellectual Property Office," or EUIPO.48
Similarly, when a trademark holder registers a trademark with this new
office, the mark will be known as a "European Union trade mark" rather
than a "Community trade mark" as it was formerly known.49
On the more consequential side, under the new goods and services
classification structure, only goods and services falling within the literal
meaning of an individual item will be considered covered by the
specification.so This amendment implements procedural changes made
necessary by the Court of Justice's decision in the 2012 "IP Translator"
case. 5' Further, for International Registrations designating the European
Union, the EU has amended the scope of the opposition period from six to
nine months after publication to one to four months after publication. The
three-month opposition period does not change. Also, trademark renewals
must be applied for by the expiration date of the registration, not by the end
of the month of the expiration date, as was the former practice.
46. Id. at 715.
47. Council Directive 2015/2424, art. 4, 2015 Oj. (L 341) 21, 88.
48. Id. at 27.
49. Id.
50. Id. at 35.
51. See, e.g., case C-307/10, CharteredInst. of PatentAttorneys v. Registrar of Trade Marks, 2012
E.C.R., 1 56 (holding that the 2008 EU Trademark Directive did not preclude the use of class
headings in a specification of goods and services so long as the specification identified with
sufficient clarity and precision the goods and/or services for which protection is sought).
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On the substantive end, perhaps the most sweeping change is one that for
many trademark practitioners in the United States is a welcome one as it
puts European substantive trademark law on par with the United States.
Previously, under EU law the right to register a mark was limited to graphic
marks only. There was no way to register a sound mark or a scent mark, for
example. As of March 23, 2016, Article 3 of the new Directive removes this
obstacle for mark holders. Under the new Directive and Regulation there is
no longer a requirement that a trademark must be represented graphically in
order to be afforded protection.52 As a result, the owners of both sound
marks and scent marks can now apply to the EUIPO and national
intellectual property offices for registration of these marks.
As for case law, perhaps the most significant intellectual property decision
of the past year was the September 2015 decision by the Court of Justice of
the European Union in Societe des Produits Nestle SA. In that case, the CJEU
held, inter alia, that the bar to registration under the EU Trademarks
Directive for signs that consist of a shape that is "necessary to obtain a
technical result" (what U.S. practitioners might call utilitarian functionality)
must be interpreted by reference to the function of the shape sought to be
trademarked. The determination of whether the sign can be registered
should not be made by reference to the method of manufacture of the goods
whose shape is sought to be trademarked.53 The Court further held that a
sign that is held to be functional under the Article 3(e) bar to registration can
never achieve acquired distinctiveness. The case was remanded to the High
Court of England and Wales, where Justice Arnold held that the shape of the
Kit Kat bar could not be registered. As a result, Nestle lost the latest round
in a long-running battle between itself and Cadbury in the protection of the
shape of the Kit Kat bar.

C.

THE

DOmNICAN

REPUBLIC

In a decision that contradicts the principles of Law 20-00 on Industrial
Property, the Court of First Instance of Santiago has held that a request to
enjoin the use of a registered trademark on the grounds of confusing
similarity must be based on a registered trademark.s* According to this
decision, tribunals cannot enjoin the use of a registered trademark on the
grounds that it is substantially similar to an unregistered trademark, even if
the unregistered trademark was in use prior to the registration date of the
registered trademark. This decision contradicts the principles Article 113 of
Law 20-00 on Industrial Property which establishes that the exclusive right
to a trademark is acquired with its first use in commerce and not by
registration.
52. Cf, Council Directive 2015/2436, art. 3, 2015 OJ. (L 336) 1, 7; Council Directive 2008/
95, art. 2, 2008 OJ. (L 299) 25, 26.
53. Case C-215/14, Societe des Produits Nestle S.A. v. Cadbury UK Ltd., 2015 E.C.R. 157.
54. Court of First Instance of Santiago, Ordinance no. 514-15-00466, Sept. 15, 2015.
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The Court of First Instance of Santiago has also established that the use of
a third party trademark constitutes unfair competition under Law 20-00 on
Industrial Property. The decision indicates that the mere use of a trademark
without the consent and authorization of the owner is unfair competition.55
The Constitutional Court found that the fact that a company promotes its
products as the best in the market alone is not unfair competition under the
dispositions of Law 20-00 on Industrial Property. The decision establishes
that unfair competition arises only when a company attacks competing
products in the market with negative information.56
The Supreme Court declared valid and legal the refusal to register a
foreign trademark in the Dominican Republic, even though the mark was
already registered in other countries, because the design was common and
not distinctive in the Dominican Republic. This decision was based on
Article 6 of the Paris Convention for the Protection of Industrial Property.57
On December 2015, the Supreme Court of Justice declared that the
prosecution for violations of law 20-00 on Industrial Property have to follow
the same procedure established in the Dominican Criminal Procedural Code
in all its aspects, including the claim for compensation due to a violation of a
registered trademark owner's rights.5
The statistics of the National Office of Industrial Property (ONAPI) show
that during the last four years, from 2012 to 2016, there has been an increase
in the registration applications for trademarks, especially for trade names,
and a slight decrease in the registration applications for slogans.59 The
statistics also show that for the period ofJanuary 1, 2016 through September
30, 2016, 34,347 applications were filed for the registry of trade names and
trademarks. Of these applications, 26,237 were for trade names, 7,734 for
trademarks, 374 for slogans, and 2 for denominations of origin. Moreover,
the statistics demonstrate that 3,516 applications were filed for trademark
renewal and 1,046 for trade name renewals.

D.

INDIA

In an important ruling, the Supreme Court of India provided clarification
as to the place where a suit can be instituted by the plaintiff under the
Copyright Act, 1957 and the Trade Marks Act, 1999.60 The Court agreed
that the very language of section 6261 of the Copyright Act and section 13462
of the Trade Marks Act provides an alternative forum, in addition to section
20 of Civil Procedure Code (the CPC) by including a district court within
55. Court of First Instance of Santiago, Decision 365-15-00769, June 02, 2015, Loto Real del
Cibao S.A. v. Banca Redy Miguel y/o Miguel C. Jdquez Espinal.
56. Constitutional Court, decision TC/0600/15, Dec. 17, 2015, Unilever Caribe, S.A.
57. Supreme Court of Justice, decision No. 42, Feb. 12, 2014.
58. Supreme Court of Justice, decision No. 523, Dec. 21, 2015.
59. Graficas Estadsticasde Publicaciones, supra note 16 (last visited Nov. 9, 2016).
60. See Indian Performing Rights Society Ltd. v. Sanjay Dalia & Anr., (2015) 63 SCR 49 (India).
61. See id. at 10.
62. See id. at 7-10.
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whose limits the plaintiff actually and voluntarily resides or carries on
business or personally works for gain:
On a due and anxious consideration of the provisions contained in
section 20 of the CPC, section 62 of the Copyright Act and section 134
of the Trade Marks Act, and the object with which the latter provisions
have been enacted, it is clear that if a cause of action has arisen wholly
or in part, where the plaintiff is residing or having its principal office/
carries on business or personally works for gain, the suit can be filed at
such place/s. But, this right to institute suit at such a place has to be
read subject to certain restrictions, such as in case plaintiff is residing or
carrying on business at a particular place/having its head office and at
such place cause of action has also arisen wholly or in part, plaintiff
cannot ignore such a place under the guise that he is carrying on
business at other far flung places also.
E.

DOMAIN NAMES

The Internet experienced a historic and transitional year in 2016. After
years of work and consultation, the Internet Corporation for Assigned
Names and Numbers (ICANN) finally completed the transition of the
functions of the Internet Assigned Names Authority (IANA) from the
United States Department of Commerce's National Telecommunications
and Information Administration (NTIA) to the global multi-stakeholder
community. On March 10, 2016, the last day of the ICANN 55 Meeting in
Marrakech, Morocco, the ICANN Board transmitted the LANA Stewardship
Transition Proposal, a plan developed by the international Internet
community, to the NTIA for approval. In early June, the NTIA informed
ICANN that it had determined that the IANA Stewardship Proposal
satisfied its strict transition criteria. Thus, on October 1, 2016, after nearly
two decades of US government control, the contract between ICANN and
the NTIA to perform LANA functions officially expired, and the LANA
function was handed over to the global Internet community.63
Eight years after the approval of the New generic Top-Level Domain
(gTLD) Program in 2008, the first round of the gTLD Program is nearing
completion, with the delegation of over 1,200 new gTLDs. Overall, the
number of domain name registrations continues to grow exponentially, with
approximately 335 million domain name registrations across all TLDs. As
reported in the Verisign Domain Name Industry Brief, this growth
represents an increase of 12.9 percent (or 38.2 million domain name
registrations) compared to 2015.64 Together under both .COM and .NET,
143.2 million domain names are registered. The number represents a 7.3
63. Stewardship of LANA? Functions Transitions to Global Internet Community as Contract with
U.S. Government Ends, ICANN (Oct. 1, 2016), https://www.icann.org/news/announcement-

2016-10-01-en.
64. Internet Grows to 334.6 Million Domain Name Registrations in the Second Quarterof 2016,
93
18.
VERISIGN (Sept. 15, 2016), https://investor.verisign.com/releasedetail.cfm?releaseid=98
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percent increase year over year. At least 149.9 million domain name
registrations are registered under country code Top Level Domains
(ccTLDs). This number represents an 8.5 percent growth (or 11.7 million
domain name registrations) year over year. Domain name registrations
under new gTLDs have also experienced considerable growth, with over 22
million domain name registrations, representing 6.6 percent of total domain
name registrations. The top five new gTLDs in terms of domain name
registrations, XYZ, .TOP, .WANG, .WIN and .CLUB, account for over 50
percent of all new gTLD domain names. Overall, the 10 largest TLDs are
.COM, .TK (Tokelau), .CN (China), .DE (Germany), .NET, .ORG, .UK
(United Kingdom), XYZ, .RU (Russian Federation) and .NL
(Netherlands).65
Cybersquatting continues to be a growing problem for rights holders, and
the number of complaints filed has increased considerably with the
introduction of new gTLDs. For instance, the number of complaints filed
under the UDRP before the World Intellectual Property Organisation
(WIPO), has been steadily increasing since the introduction of the first new
gTLDs in 2013. While the number of domain name disputes filed with
WIPO in 2015 did not surpass the record high of 2,884 cases filed in 2012, it
did reach the third highest level since 1999. As reported by the WIPO,
domain name disputes under new gTLDs accounted for an impressive 10.5
percent of all UDRPs filed with WIPO in 2015,66 with .XYZ, .CLUB and
.EMAIL amongst the new gTLDs with most disputed domain names. As of
November 2016, 2,647 complaints had been filed with WIPO in 2016 with
the figure undoubtedly going up as a direct result of the introduction of new
gTLDs into the DNS.
It is also worth noting that 71 ccTLD Registries have adopted the UDRP
(or a variation of it) and have designated the WIPO as dispute resolution
provider. As a result, ccTLD disputes represented 13.7 percent of cases filed
with the WIPO in 2015, a figure which is also likely to increase this year.
Furthermore, many trademark owners have now opted to file Uniform
Rapid Suspension (URS) complaints instead of a UDRP, which has likely
slowed the growth of UDRP complaints. Since the first URS case was filed
in 2013, over 600 URS complaints have been filed before the Forum
(formerly known as NAF), with a considerably high number of cases
resulting in a decision in favor of complainants.
While the URS was originally designed for new gTLDs and is not an
ICANN consensus policy, it is proving to be a useful and cost-effective
mechanism for protecting rights, although clearly it has been subject to
criticism as it only provides for the suspension of a domain name (as opposed
to transfer) as remedy. Several legacy gTLDs have voluntarily adopted the
65. The Verisign Domain Name Industry Brief, VERISIGN, https://www.verisign.com/enUS/
domain-names/dnib/index.xhtml#home.
66. Cybersquatting Cases Up in 2015, Driven by New gTLDs, WoLD. INTELLECTUAL
PROPERTY ORGANIZAIKON (Mar. 18, 2016), http://www.wipo.int/pressroom/en/articles/2016/
article 0003.html.
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URS, including .TRAVEL, .PRO, .CAT and, more recently, .TEL and

IH.
A.

Copyright67
UNITED STATES

The jury in a federal district court in California returned a stunning
verdict determining that Google was shielded from liability for copyright
infringement based on the affirmative defense of fair use. 68 Previously, the
Federal Circuit Court of Appeals had reversed the lower court, ruling that
Google's unauthorized copying of declaratory code for thirty-seven distinct
application programming interfaces (APIs) from Oracle's popular JAVA
computer program constituted copyright infringement.69 Google had
simply copied the APIs, rather than writing its own code for its Android
software for smartphones,70 but the lower court had ruled that the API
structure was not copyrightable under section 102(b) of the Copyright Act
because it was a system or method of operation. The Federal Circuit Court,
however, found that the APIs contained sufficient "expression" to be
deserving of copyright protection and remanded the case to the lower court
71
for a determination of Google's affirmative defense of fair use. Google
filed a petition for a writ of certiorari before the Supreme Court, but the
Supreme Court declined to hear the case on appeal.72
The fair use doctrine is codified in the United States Copyright Act.73 In
determining whether the unauthorized copying of a work is protected by the
fair use doctrine, the court considers several factors, including the nature of
the work, the purpose of the use (e.g., for profit vs. critical commentary or
social good), the substantiality of the copying in relation to the work, and
whether such copying adversely affects the market for the author's work.74
On May 26, 2016, the jury returned a unanimous verdict holding that
Google's use constituted fair use under the U.S. Copyright Act.75
67. Copyright Section Editor: Michelle Wynne, Zillow Group, Inc., Seattle, WA. Authors:
United States: Ralph H. Cathcart, Ladas & Parry LLP, New York, NY; European Union:
Daniel B. Koburger, Benjamin N. Cordozo School of Law, New York, NY and Daniel Cooper,

Cooper and Kurz, Stamford, CT.; India: Manish Dhingra, Dhingra & Singh, Delhi, India;
Dominican Republic: Fabio Jose Guzman Saladin, and Pamela Benzin Arbaje, Guzm6n Ariza,

Santo Domingo, Dominican Republic.
68. Oracle Am., Inc. v. Google Inc., No. C 10-03561 WHA, 2016 WL 3181206, at *1-*2 (N.D.
Cal. June 8, 2016).
69. Oracle America, Inc. v. Google, Inc., 750 F.3d 1339, 1348 (Fed. Cir. 2014).
70. Id. at 1370.
71. Id. at 1381.
72. Oracle America, Inc. v. Google, Inc., 750 F.3d 1339 (Fed. Cir. 2014); cert. denied, 2014 WL
5319724 (U.S. Oct. 6, 2014) (No. 14-410).
73. 17 U.S.C. § 107 (2016).
74. Id.
75. Oracle Am., Inc., WL 3181206 at *1.
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The verdict has far ranging implications, both for software developers and
Oracle, who stood poised to demand over nine billion dollars in damages.76
Further, as Google's Android products prospered, Oracle's JAVA licensing
business, which relied heavily on "feature-phones," cratered.77 Oracle
immediately vowed it would appeal the verdicts and, on October 26, 2016,
Oracle formally filed a notice of appeal before the Federal Circuit Court,
seeking to appeal the jury's verdict.79
In another case involving Google, the Supreme Court of the United
States rejected Authors Guild's petition for writ of certiorariso to appeal the
Second Circuit's ruling, which held that "Google Books" does not infringe
the copyrights of published authors.8l In 2004, Google launched the
"Google Library Project" and "Google Books Project," in cooperation with
major research libraries around the world, to scan and digitally catalogue
tens of millions of books.82 To date, Google has digitally copied
approximately thirty million books to the Google Books digital catalog.83
Essentially, Google copied (without permission) each book in its entirety,
extracting and indexing the book's machine readable text. 84 Internet users
could not view the entire book, but instead were limited to "text mining"
where only small snippets containing the specific text searched were
viewable by the public.85 Google does not charge a fee or directly feature
any advertising in connection with the Google Books Project.
Section 107 of the United States Copyright Act sets forth several factors
relevant to identifying whether a particular use qualifies as a fair use. 86 Fair
use is an affirmative defense to copyright infringement and thus does not
negate the elements for a finding of infringement. Rather, the defense
operates to excuse the infringer from liability and damages. The Second
Circuit determined that Google was shielded from liability because 1) its
unauthorized use promoted the arts and sciences; 2) Google's profit
motivation did not outweigh the transformative nature of Google's use; 3)
the "snippets" were not substantial in terms of copying expressive content;
76. Joe Mullin, Google Beats Oracle-Android Makes "FairUse" of fAVA APIs, ARSTECHNICA
(May 26, 2016), https://arstechnica.com/tech-policy/2016/05/google-wins-trial-against-oracleas-jury-finds-android-is-fair-use/.
77. Id.
78. Id.
79. Oracle America, Inc. v. Google, Inc., No. C 10-03561 WHA, 2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 74931
(Northern District of California entered June 8, 2016), appeal filed, No. CV 10-03561 WHA
(9th Cir. Oct. 26, 2016).
80. Google, Inc. v. Oracle America, Inc., 804 F.3d 202 (2d Cir. 2015), cert. denied, 84 U.S.L.W.
3357 (U.S. Apr. 18, 2016) (No. 15-849).
81. Authors Guild, 804 F.3d 202, 228 (2d Cir. 2015).
82. Id. at 208.
83. Tim Wu, What Ever Happenedto Google Books?, Ti-E NEW YORKER (Sept. 11, 2015), http:/
/www.newyorker.com/business/currency/what-ever-happened-to-google-books.
84. Authors Guild, 804 F.3d at 209.
85. Id. at 208-210.
86. 17 U.S.C. § 107 (2016).
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and 4) the use did not adversely affect the market for the authors' books or
provide a substitute therefor.87 The Court was especially focused on the
highly transformative nature of Google Books and the fact that the text
which was made available to users was sufficiently limited so as not to
provide a market substitute for the full versions of the books.88
Google has always maintained that Google Books provided the public
with a new way to discover books of interest and that increased public
awareness would help authors.89 By using Google's tool, people would be
able to formulate their own queries, review search results, and find books
that they otherwise may not have not found.90 Of course, many authors
vehemently disagree and view Google's actions as an infringement of both
the Constitutional and statutory monopoly afforded to authors concerning
their exclusive rights to copy, distribute, display, and make derivative works
of their works. Indeed, the president of the Authors Guild, Roxana
Robinson, remarked that "what we are seeing is a trend of redistribution of
wealth from the creative sector to the tech sector across the entire spectrum
of the arts."91 In either case, the Supreme Court's denial of certiorari
appears to have "closed the book," if you will, on this chapter of the epic
battle between Google and the Authors Guild.92
B.

EUROPE

The judgments by the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU)
that received the most recognition in 2016 were GS Media93 and McFadden.94
Beyond these judicial landmarks, the EU has seen a policy-driven event with
an unforeseeable and potentially wide-ranging scope: the EU copyright
reform proposal.95
One case, GS Media, referred to the CJEU by the Dutch Supreme
Court,96 concerned the liability of an individual who hyperlinked, without
87. Authors Guild, 804 F.3d at 207-208.
88. Id. at 229.
89. Id.
90. Adam Liptak & Alexandra Alter, Challenge to Google Books is Declined by Supreme Court,
N.Y. TIMEs (Apr. 18, 2016), http://www.nytimes.com/2016/04/19/technology/google-bookscase.html.
91. Id.
92. Zosha Millman, Closing the Book on Authors Guild v. Google Books, THE LExmBLOG
NETWORK (Apr. 18, 2016), http://www.lxbn.com/2016/04/18/closing-the-book-on-authorsguild-v-google-books/.
93. Case C 160/15, GS Media BV v. Sanoma Media Netherlands BV et al.,
ECLI:EU:C:2016:644.
94. Case C 484/14, Tobias Mc Fadden v. Sony Music Entertainment Germany GmbH,
EU:C:2016:689.
95. Commission of the European Communities Proposal for a Directive of the European
Parliament and of the Council on Copyright in the Digital Single Market, COM (2016) 593
Final (September 2016).
96. HR 3 April 2015, ECLI 2015, 841 m.nt. (GS Media B.V./Sanoma Media Netherlands B.V.
c.s.) (Neth.).
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consent, to photographs from a Playboy magazine photoshoot, which were
initially made freely available online without authorization97 The CJEU
clarified that holding someone responsible for infringing through
'communication to the public'98 in a case of linking to content made available
without authorization, required an individual assessment.99 The Court
emphasized the role of the user and the deliberate nature of the user's
actions,'oo including: (1) if the actor did not act for personal gain, could he
reasonably not have known the work had been made available on the
internet without the copyright holder's permission; (2) if the actor ought to
have known; and (3) if the actor acted for personal gain, could he rebut the
presumption that he had full knowledge.'o' Thus, in the case, the CJEU
allowed a distinction between hyperlinking as an ordinary internet user and
hyperlinking to seek profit. It extended Svensson, where the CJEU referred
to content made available with consent, which the CJEU held does not
constitute "communication to the public."02
The second case, McFadden, was referred to the CJEU by the Regional
Court, Munich I, Germany103 In McFadden, the issue was whether a rights
holder can demand an injunction against an intermediary internet service
provider that grants free access for purposes of its actual business services
(e.g., a caf6) when a user makes a protected work available to the public
through the intermediary without the right holder's consent. 04 The CJEU
held that it was permissible to require password protection by the
intermediary,05 but not to require monitoring of the data flow or
termination of the connection.0o6 The former is a dissuasive measurement if
the users are required to identify themselves07 and it is a measurement that
does not damage the intermediary's freedom to conduct businessos or
undermine the user's right of freedom of information. o9 But, the CJEU did
not answer who bears the costs of an injunction where the service provider
cannot be held liable.
97. GS Media, 1 24.
98. Directive 2001/29/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council on the
Harmonisation of Certain Aspects of Copyright and Related Rights in the Information Society,
2001 OJ. L 167/11, art. 3(1).
99. GS Media, 1 33.
100. GS Media, 135.
101. Id. at ¶¶ 47, 49, 51.
102. Id. at 1 42.
103. Landgericht Mdinchen I [LG Miinchen I] [Regional Court of Appeals, Munich 1]
September 9, 2014, 7 0 14719/12, GEWERBLICHER RECHTSSCHUTZ UND
URHEBERRECHT [GRUR] 2015, 70.
104. McFadden, 1 2.
105. Id. at ¶T 90-96.
106. Id. at ¶T 87-88.
107. Id. at 1 96.
108. Id. at 1 91; Directive 2001/29/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council on
Certain Legal Aspects of Information Society Services, in Particular Electronic Commerce, in
the Internal Market, 2000 OJ. L 17/07, at art. 15(1).
109. McFadden, 1 92.
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On December 9, 2015, the Commission unveiled its proposed regulation
on the portability of copyrighted content aimed at furthering the Digital
Single Market initiative.Io Under the regulation, providers of subscriptionbased online content must enable subscribers to that content from one EU
member state who are "temporarily present" in another EU member state to
access and use the subscription content in the second EU state.III While it is
currently unclear what "temporarily present" means,11 2 it does seem clear
that the purpose of the new regulation is to allow users to be able to take the
copyrighted content they have license to listen to, view, etc., with them
across the borders of EU member countries. Concomitantly, the proposed
regulation provides that the copyright license flowing from such
subscription-based content-and the infringement of copyright that would
come from actions violating the terms of the license-deal solely with the
subscriber's "member state of residence.""3 This obviates the need for, and
eliminates the ability of, content providers to condition access to content
outside the subscriber's home jurisdiction on the agreement to a license in
each EU member state wherein the subscriber attempts to access or use that
content.
C.

INDIA

The Delhi High Court elaborated on the interpretation of Section 15114 of

the Copyright Act which in part states that, if copyright in a design is
capable of registration under the Designs Act, even if the design is not
registered, the copyright in the design will cease to exist as soon as the
product or article incorporating the design is produced more than fifty times
through an industrial process.
The Court first commented on the rationale behind Section 15"1 of the
Act and said, "[a]s evident from the language of Section 1516 of the
Copyright Act, copyright does not subsist in a registered design." The
rationale for this is that someone's choice of design registration is a
conscious decision to use the underlying work for mass production. The
design has a commercial element and reaches a wider audience through the
medium of the product or the article. This is of course possible in the cases
of designs of products and articles that are sold widely or have an expansive
market. But, that is not always so in the case of an artistic work- typically a
painting, a drawing or even a sculpture, for instance (which are the closest
species of copyrights that overlap with designs). Yet the transformation of a
work of art into a design results in the possibility of its protection as a
110.
111.
112.
than
113.
114.
115.
116.

E.C. Reg. 2015/0284 (COD), art. 1 (Dec. 9, 2015).
Id. at art. 3(1).
See id. at art. 2(d) (defining "temporarily present" as presence in a Member State "other
the Member State of residence").
Id. at arts. 4, 5(1).
See Indian Copyright Act (1957) at art. 15.
Id.
Id.
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design. Section 15(1)117 dictates that if this kind of work is registered as a
design, there is no copyright protection. Section 15(2)118 on the other hand,
says that if a work is capable of design registration, and is not registered, but
replicated as a product or article through a design more than 50 times
through mechanical process, copyright in that work ceases. The Court said,
We do hold that in the original work of art, copyright would exist and the
author/holder would continue enjoying the longer protection granted under
the Copyright Act in respect of the original artistic work. Thus, for instance
a famous painting will continue to enjoy the protection available to an
artistic work under the Copyright Act. A design created from that painting
for the purpose of industrial application on an article so as to produce an
article which has features of shape, or configuration or pattern or ornament
or composition of lines or colors and which appeals to the eye would also be
entitled design protection in terms of the provisions of the Designs Act.
Therefore, if the design is registered under the Designs Act, the Design
would lose its copyright protection under the Copyright Act but not the
original painting.
D.

DomHNIcAN

REPUBLIC

In April 2015, the Court. of Appeals of the National District established a
distinction between ideas and copyrightable work, choosing to follow the
international jurisprudence criteria on the topic. The Court determined
that, ideas alone, which are described, explained, illustrated or incorporated
in a play, are protectable only in their form of expression, which must be
original. Using this logic, the Court found that the use in an advertisement
of a phrase contained in a musical piece does not by itself constitute a nonauthorized reproduction if the phrase is not synced with the rhythm of the
musical piece. In this particular case, the claimants were the copyright
owners of a popular song in the Dominican Republic named "ElTeke," and
the defendant was a lottery named Loteka that used a phrase of that song in
an advertisement to promote their business. As part of its reasoning, the
Constitutional Court analyzed the significance of the expression "el teke" in
the national territory, the context in which the phrase was used, and the
intention of the advertisement. The Court concluded that, in the context of
the advertisement, the defendants were using the phrase because of its
meaning and, because they did not use a musical rhythm, it could not be
linked to the song of the claimants.119
The Court of First Instance of the Duarte Province has ruled that the
collective rights of management organizations must demonstrate the
repertoire over which they have rights to be able to collect on behalf of
authors and composers. This ruling goes against the jurisprudential criteria
117. Id.
118. Id.
119. Court of Appeal of the National District, Decision 286-15, April 30, 2015,

Josi Rafael

Colon y Carlos Napoleon Santana vs. Loteka SRL y Mario Peguero.
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of other countries that presume these organizations represent an unnamed
repertoire.120 Moreover, in a case regarding the collection of royalties, the
Court of First Instance of the Duarte Province established that the collective
rights management organizations must justify the origin and amount of the
debt for which they request interim measures.121
In a case regarding architectural plagiarism, the Court of Appeal of the
National District, when referring to the appointment of experts for
performing studies and presenting reports, indicated that the fact that an
appointed expert in architecture was a member of the same university that
previously issued a study on the case could be considered a reason for
recusal. 122
On July 20, 2016, the Constitutional Court declared in conformity with
the constitution that the Beijing Treaty on Audiovisual Performances, which
is currently awaiting ratification by the Congress, conforms to the
constitution, thus exercising the preventive control of constitutionality
conceived in article 185, numeral 2 of the Dominican Constitution.23 This
is an important -measure to protect the performers in relation to their
interpretations in audiovisual performances. The Dominican legislation
does not have any national law in this regard and the WIPO Performances
and Phonograms Treaty, ratified by the Dominican Republic in 2006, does
not cover the protections established in the Beijing Treaty.

120. Court of First Instance of Duarte. Resolution number 00034/2015, September 7, 2015.
Sgacedom vs. El Tanque y Wellington Genao.
121. Court of First Instance of Duarte. Resolution number 40/2015, July 27, 2015, Sociedad de
Autores Compositores y Editores Dominicanosde musica Inc. (SGACEDOM) vs Bomba La Fortunay
Alex Serrata.
122. Court of Appeal of the National District, resolution No. 27-2015, October 19, 2015, Jesus
Osiris Garcia Pirez vs Victor Durdn & Asociados, S.A. and Victor Manuel Durdn Nziiez.
123. Constitutional Court, TC/0302/16, July 20, 2016.
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